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We  survey  the  literature  on  the  general  equilibrium  approach  IO  trade  in  exhaustible  resources  and 
present  a  model  in  which  conversion  costs  are  incorporated  and  in  which  the  usual  balance  of 
payments  condition  is  relaxed.  It  is  found  that  in  many  cases  the  problem  of  dynamic  incon- 
sistency  will  arise. 
1.  Introduction 
The  existing  literature  on  the  theory  of  exhaustible  resources  in  open 
economies  can  be  divided  into  two  broad  categories.  Firstly  there  is  an 
approach  which  is of  a partial  equilibrium  nature.  Here  a  distinction  can  be 
made  between  several  cases according  to  the  market  power  of  the  country 
under  consideration.  One  branch,  to  which  notable  contributions  were  made 
by  Long  (1974),  Vousden  (1974),  Kemp  and  Suzuki  (1975),  Kemp  (1976), 
Aarrestad  (1978)  and  Kemp  and  Long  (1980a,  b,c),  is  concerned  with  the 
problem  of  how  a single  economy  in  the  possession of  an  exhaustible  resource 
(of  known  or  unknown  magnitude)  should  exploit  its  resource  in  an  optimal 
way  in  a  world  where  prices  are  given  to  it,  in  the  sense that  the  economy’s 
policy  is assumed  not  to  influence  prices.  In  most  studies  the  resource  price  is 
kept  constant  but  in  some  of  them  it  is assumed  to  grow  exponentially.  It  is 
assumed  that  perfect  competition  on  the  world  market  prevails.  Another 
branch  takes  the  opposite  point  of  view,  namely  that  the  country  under 
consideration  is a monopolist  [see e.g. Dasgupta,  Eastwood  and  Heal  (1978)]. 
Here  the  economy  is facing  a given  world  demand  schedule,  having  the  price  of 
the  resource  good  as the  single  argument.  Finally,  also  the  intermediate  cases 
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have  been  studied.  For  the  oligopoly  case  the  work  of  Dasgupta  and  Heal 
(1979)  can  be  mentioned.  Newbery  (1981)  has  elaborated  on  the  situation 
where  given  world  demand  is met  by  a resource-rich  cartel  and  a resource-poor 
fringe,  in  the  presence  of  a backstop  technology.  Common  to  all contributions 
in  this  category  is  that  they  take  world  market  prices,  or  the  world  demand 
schedule,  given  to  the  economy.  The  second  category  follows  the  general 
equilibrium  methodology  by  studying  equilibrium  in  a setting  of,  mostly,  two 
trading  economies  or groups  of  countries,  where  demand  schedules are derived 
within  the  model.  Without  wishing  to  deny  the  relevance  of  the  first  approach, 
we  prefer  the  latter  because  it  may  give  better  insight  into  the  actual  working 
of  world  markets  for  exhaustible  resources  and  because,  obviously,  the  former 
line  of  thought  is covered  by  the  latter. 
The  objective  of  the  present  paper  is  twofold.  Firstly  we  provide  a  brief 
survey  of  the  literature  on  this  general  equilibrium  approach  (section  2). 
Subsequently,  we  discuss  a  small  and  simple  model  in  this  line  of  thought, 
which  takes  into  account  extraction  costs. In  section  3 the  model  is presented 
as  well  as  the  conditions  necessary  for  an  optimal  solution.  In  section  4  we 
elaborate  on  these  conditions  and  describe  the  optimal  solution.  Existence  is 
proved  in  section  5.  Welfare  properties  are  presented  in  section  6.  Section  7 
gives  an  example.  The  final  section  8 contains  the  conclusion. 
2.  A survey  of  equilibrium  models  with  trade  in  exhaustible  resources 
Only  recently  theoretical  economists  have  turned  their  attention  to  general 
equilibrium  models  where  explicit  allowance  is made  for  exhaustible  resources. 
Of  course,  natural  resources  were  discussed earlier  in  international  economics 
[see e.g. Singer  (1950)  and  Kemp  and  Ohyama  (1978)],  but  the  exhaustibility  of 
resources  was  not  taken  into  account.  To  our  knowledge  Kemp  and  Long 
(1980d)  and  Chiarella  (1980)  were  the  first  to  incorporate  this  feature. 
Kemp  and  Long  introduce  two  countries:  a resource-rich  country  (labeled  1) 
and  a resource-poor  country  (labeled  2). The  first  country  must  import  all  its 
consumption  and  pays  for  this  by  exporting  its  natural  resource.  The  initial 
size of  this  resource  is  S,.  S(t)  denotes  what  is left  at  time  t.  Extraction  is 
costless  and  is  denoted  by  E(t).  Country  1  is  maximizing  (omitting  time 
indices  when  possible) 
II  =/-em  P1’ul(Ci)dt, 
0 
subject  to 
E(t)  2  0, 
C,  =pE. 
(1) 
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Here  pi  is  the  rate  of  time  preference  (pi  2  0),  ui  is the  instantaneous  utility 
function,  C,  is the  rate  of  consumption.  ui  is assumed  to  be increasing,  strictly 
concave  and  satisfying  u’(0) =  co.  p  is the  price  of  the  resource  good  in  terms 
of  the  consumption.  Constraint  (1)  is self-evident,  and  (2)  expresses that  the 
balance  of  payments  is always  in  equilibrium,  or  alternatively,  that  no  con- 
sumption  goods  can  be  stored  and  consumed  later.  The  resource-poor  country 
has  no  resources,  but  it  can  convert  the  resource  good  into  consumer  goods  by 
means  of  a  technology  described  by  a production  function  F(E).  F  is strictly 
increasing,  concave  and  satisfies  F’(0)  =  co. Country  2  maximizes 
Iz = /  me-p2ru2(C2)dlr 
0 
subject  to 
C2=F(E)-pE,  E20, 
where  u2  satisfies  the  same  conditions  as  ui.  The  meaning  of  pz  and  C,  is 
clear. 
For  the  moment  we  shall  assume  that  p(t)  is  for  both  countries  a known 
and  given  function  of  t  so  that  both  countries  act  as price-takers.  It  follows 
that  country  2’s  problem  is reduced  to  the  maximization  (at  each  moment  of 
time)  of 
f’(E)  -pE,  E20, 
making  demand  for  the  resource  independent  of  the  second  country’s  prefer- 
ences.  Since the  assumptions  made  so far  make  certain  that  g(t)  (the  solution 
of  the  problem  presented  above)  is  strictly  positive  for  all  r,  we  must  have 
F’( i?)  = p.  No  other  general  conclusions  can be  drawn:  the  signs of  C,,  p  and 
i  (dots  refer  to  time  derivatives,  hats  are  omitted  when  possible)  depend  on 
u.;‘C,/u;  and  F”E/F’.  If  these  quantities  are  bounded  from  below  by  -1, 
C, -z 0,  ,!? < 0  and  p  > 0.  An  example  of  this  is given  by  the  ‘Cobb-Douglas’ 
case: 
u;( C,) = cp,  O<v;<l,  i=1,2, 
F(E)=E*,  O<cu<l. 
In  this  special  case, which  can  be  solved  explicitly,  exploitation  is  decreasing 
exponentially. 
Now,  drop  the  assumption  that  p(t)  is taken  as given  by  both  countries  and 
instead  assume  that  the  resource-rich  country  takes into  account  the  demand  of 
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can  be  said  than  that  the  solution  pattern  will  differ  from  the competitive  case. 
If  the  production  function  is Cobb-Douglas,  the  two  solution  paths  however 
coincide,  that  is:  the  resource-rich  country  has no  effective  monopoly  power.  A 
similar  result  has  been  derived  by  Stiglitz  (1976)  in  the  context  of  a  closed 
economy. 
If  the  resource-poor  country  is aggressive, it  offers  arbitrarily  low  prices  for 
the  resource.  This  must  be accepted  by  the  resource-rich  country,  whether  it  is 
active  or  not. 
Chiarella  (1980)  works  along  the  same  lines  as  Kemp  and  Long.  The 
differences  between  the  models  are  given  below: 
-  In  both  countries  the  fully  employed  labour  force  (L,.)  grows  exponentially 
at  an  exogeneously  given  rate  ni. 
-  The  utility  functions  are Li  In C/L,. 
-  The  model  allows  for  capital  accumulation  and  technical  progress  in  the 
following  way: 
k  = eX’Ka’1Eu2L~’  -  pE  -  C,. 
Both  countries  are  assumed  to  behave  passively.  After  a complicated  analysis 
the  following  results  are obtained: 
(a)  Due  to  the  particular  function  ~(r  the  supply  of  the  resource  good  is 
price-inelastic. 
(b)  For  the  share  of  each country  in  total  consumption  and  for  the  growth  rate 
of  the  resource  price  there  exist  asymptotic  values which  are monotonically 
approached.  Whether  optimal  paths  tending  to  these  values  are  increasing 
or  decreasing  depends  on  the  initial  values  S,,  K,,  Lie. 
(c) As long  as the  equilibrium  values  are not  reached  the  optimal  path  does  not 
satisfy  the  Solow-Stiglitz  efficiency  condition  and  hence  the  solution  is not 
Pareto-efficient. 
If  an  additional  market  is  introduced  where  the  resource-poor  country  can 
borrow  the  non-resource  good  at  an  interest  rate  r,  the  main  results  are: 
(a) p/p  = r;  the  Solow-Stiglitz  efficiency  condition  is always  met. 
(b)The  share  in  total  consumption  is  growing  for  the  country  that  has  the 
smaller  rate  of  time  preference. 
3.  A  model  of  trade  with  exhaustible  resources 
Below  we  present  a  model  of  trade  between  two  countries  both  in  the 
possession  of  a resource,  a cake,  say. Moreover,  this  type  of  cake  is the  only 
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advantage  of  trade  for  both  countries?  What  would  be  Pareto-optimal  rates of 
cake-mining  and  cake-eating?  Will  free  trade  result  in  Pareto-optimal  pro- 
grams;!  What  type  of  price-path  can we expect  for  the  resource,  or  alternatively 
what  is  the  implicit  rate  of  interest?  This  last  question  was  the  original 
motivation  of  this  study.  In  the  introduction  we mentioned  a number  of  partial 
equilibrium  papers  on  optimal  exploitation  where  a perfectly  forsighted  price- 
path  was given.  Such a price-path  follows  from  our  analysis  below. 
The  question  concerning  the  advantages  of  trade  is  problematic.  If  both 
countries  have  cakes of  an identical  kind  and  the  only  problem  is to  derive  the 
rate  of  eating,  there  is  no  reason  for  trade  at  all.  Therefore  we  assume  that 
mining  a cake  at  rate  Ei (i  = 1,2)  results  in  a consumable  rate  of  Fi( E;).  Fi is 
to  be  taken  increasing  and  strictly  concave,  so by  Jensen’s  inequality  there  is 
definitely  an  incentive  to  trade  [see Elbers  and  Withagen  (1982)  for  the  closed 
economy  case]. 
There  are  several ways  of  interpreting  F(E).  First  we  can  consider  E  as a 
flow  of  raw  material  and  F(E)  as the  production.  However,  we  do  not  allow 
country  1 to  process  the  second  country’s  raw  material  and  vice-versa.  Another 
interpretation  is  to  consider  E -  F(E)  as conversion  costs,  as the  title  of  this 
paper  suggests.  In  that  case one would,  of  course,  expect  that  E 2  F(E)  for  all 
E r  0.  However,  this  restriction  has no  influence  on  the  further  analysis.  So we 
drop  it  as unnecessary. 
The  other  features  of  the  model  are  as follows.  Initial  resources of  the  cakes 
(S;ot  i = 1,2)  are  given.  Both  countries  maximize  discounted  utility  over  an 
infinite  horizon.  The  current  account  of  the balance  of  payments  may  be out  of 
equilibrium  but  the  total  value  of  imports  should  not  exceed  the  total  value  of 
exports.  Formally,  each country  faces the  following  problem: 
/ 
Q) 
maxI,=  e-p~‘ui(Ci(t))dt, 
0 
subject  to 
/  mEi(t)l;  Sio, 
0 
W;(t)+C,(r)=&(E,), 
E;(t)  2  0. 
Here,  for  i = 1,2,  pi  denotes  the  rate  of  time  preference,  u,  is  the  utility 
function  (u’  > 0,  u”  < 0,  u’(0) =  cc),  C,  is the  rate  of  consumption,  W, is  the 
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rate  of  net  exports,  Ei is the  rate  of  exploitation,  4,  is the  initial  amount  of 
the  resource,  6  is the  conversion  function,  increasing  and  strictly  concave,  and 
p(t)  is  the  price-path  of  the  resource  good,  assumed  perfectly  known  in 
advance  to  both  countries.  Since the  resources  don’t  enter  trade  or  the  welfare 
functionals,  we  can  rescale  Ei  and  &  such  that  the  initial  amounts  Si,  are 
equal  to  unity, 
i=  1,2.  (7) 
The  Lagrangean  of  the  problem  is (suppressing  i) 
L=eeP’u(C)-qE+A(F(E)-C-  W)+cpWp+pE. 
An  optimal  solution  i  = {c,  6,  I@) satisfies (4)-(7)  and,  moreover,  there  exist 
non-negative  constants  4 and  Q and  non-negative  piece-wise  continuous  x  and 
fi  such  that 
aL/fX=O:  e-p’u’(~)-~=O, 
aL/aE=o:  -Q+XF’(Q+p=o, 
aL/aw=o:  -x++p=o, 
4.  Optimal  programs  in competitive  equilibrium 
The  way  the  above  problem  is  posed  implies  that  each  country  takes  the 
prices  p(t)  as given.  As usual we  call (ir,  i,,  8)  a general  equilibrium  if,  given 
j,  both  countries’  optimal  programs  ii,  i,  are consistent  in  the  sense that 
‘GF,(r) + Jig?)  = 0,  Vr.  02) 
The  fact  that  for  both  countries  xi  is piece-wise  continuous  implies  [from  (lo)] 
that  $  must  be  piece-wise  continuous  itself.  [Note  that  $J~  + 0  from  (8)  and 
from  u’(0)  =  co.]  It  is also immediate  that  j  > 0.  We  now  state: 
Theorem  I.  If  j  is  an  equilibrium  price  function,  then  fi  is  continuous  and 
strictly  decreasing. 
Proof.  Suppose  there  occurs  a  discontinuity  at  to > 0.  $  is piece-wise  con- 
tinuous,  so  the  discontinuity  must  be  an  (isolated)  jump.  From  (10)  xi  also jumps  in  the  same  direction  as 3.  c,  jumps  (strictly)  in  the  opposite  direction 
as fi  [from  (S)],  and  ki  jumps  in  the  same direction. 
Write  f(  + ) and  f(  -  ) for  lim,  1  ,,f(  t ) and  lim,  r ,,,/(  t ). 
From  (9)  and  (lo), 
(I$(-)F’(2(-))+jIL(-)=@$(+)F@(+))+fi(+). 
If  8(  -)  > 8(  +)(  2  0),  p(  -)  = 0,  and  since  F’  is  decreasing,  it  follows  that 
p(  -)  > i(  +).  If  ,!?( -)  < i?( +),  it  follows  that  j(  -)  <$(  +).  Equivalently, 
p(-)rjq+)-s(-)hq+), 
‘5(+)2fi(-)=4(+)&q-). 
The  conclusion  is that 
ClW  + czw  -4(4(d)  -G(W))  (13) 
will  be positive  or  negative  (depending  on  the  direction  of  the jump  in  $)  on  a 
small  interval  (to,  t,, + h).  But  from  (4)  and  (12)  expression  (13)  should  vanish 
for  all  t,  so we  have  a contradiction.  Suppose  now  that  p(t)  is non-decreasing 
on  (ti,  f,  + h).  It  follows  from  (8)  that  r?, is strictly  decreasing  on  (t,,  t,  + Iz). 
On  the  other  hand  E,  is non-decreasing  [eq.  (9)]  so we  have again  a contradic- 
tion.  Cl 
Corollary.  bi  is  tnonotonical!y  decreasing  as  long  as  it  is posithe  and  i?,  is 
continuous. 
Proof.  Note  that,  according  to  (lo),  x  and  B  only  differ  by  a  scale factor. 
Therefore,  from  Theorem  1,  1  is also continuous  and  strictly  decreasing.  That 
I?,  is non-increasing  follows  from  eq.  (9).  Eq.  (8)  shows  that  c?; is continuous. 
Since 
the  right-hand  side of  this  expression  must  be  continuous  as well.  A  conceiv- 
able  jump  in  6,  is  therefore  always  accompanied  by  a jump  in  2,  in  the 
opposite  direction.  One  of  these jumps  is going  to  violate  the condition  that  I?, 
is non-increasing.  Suppose  now  that  ii  > 0  for  some  t,.  From  continuity 
6,(t)  is positive  in a neighbourhood  of  f0  and  P,(t)  = 0 in  this  neighbourhood. 
Eq.  (9)  and  Theorem  1 imply  then  that  fii  is strictly  decreasing  as long  as it  is 
positive.  0 
Under  the  assumption  made  so  far  consumption  is  always  positive  in  a 
competitive  equilibrium  and  hence  production  is  also  positive.  However.  it 204  C.  Elbers  and  C.  Withagen,  Trading  in  exhaustible  resources 
could  be that  one  of  the countries’  resources is exhausted  in  finite  time.  In  fact, 
as  casual  inspection  shows,  this  is  the  case to  be  expected.  We  shall  give  an 
example  below. 
The  necessary  conditions  (4)-(11)  are also sufficient  for  an  optimum.  In  fact, 
the  optimal  program  in  the  single  country  problem,  if  it  exists, is unique. 
Theorem  2.  Suppose that  ( c,  8,  b?, 4, A, fi,  Q )  satisfies (4)-(11).  Then  c,  k’, I@ 
is the  unique  optimal  solution  to (3). 
Proof.  See Elbers  and  Withagen  (1983).  The  theorem  is  proved  using  stan- 
dard  techniques  that  can  be  found  for  instance  in  Long  and  Vousden  (1977, 
theorem  6). 
5.  Existence  of  competitive  equilibrium 
The  existence  an  optimal  program  for  a  single  country  depends  on  the 
behaviour  of  p(t).  An  (eventually)  non-decreasing  price  is out  of  the  question 
since postponing  production  would  not  harm  the  budget  and  at the  same time, 
by  producing  very  tiny  quantities,  the  concavity  of  the  production  function 
could  be  evaded:  there  is  no  optimal  production  plan.  On  the  other  hand  if 
prices  fall  too  rapidly  utility  could  be  increased  beyond  any  bound.  The 
following  (non-rigorous)  argument  sketches a proof  of  existence  of  a competi- 
tive  equilibrium  under  the  assumptions  listed  above. 
Consider  the  following  problem: 
maxim{  (1 -  ~)‘e-Pl’z+(Ci)  + ~e-P2’u2(Cz)}  dt >  a > 0 3 
subject  to 
l-/*E,dtzO,  i=1,2, 
0 
Ei>O,  Ci>O,  i=  1,2, 
f+,(E,)+F,(E,)-Cl-C,zO. 
The  necessary  and  (analogous  to  Theorem  2)  sufficient  conditions  for  an 
optimum  are:  there  exist  non-negative  constants  qi”),  41”)  and  non-negative C.  Elbers  and  C.  Wirhagen.  Trading  ir7  exhawrible  resources  205 
piece-wise  continuous  pr)(  t),  ~(2u)(  t),  p(“)(t),  such  that 
(1  -  a)e-PlrU;(  C,(u)) =p(“) 
(-+vu;(  cp)  =p 
-q/“‘+  /pp’“‘y(  Ep)  = 0,  i=  1,2 
P’a)(F~(E1(U))+F2(E~a))-C1(U’-CZ(~’)=0 
p!“‘E!“’  = 0  I  I  i=1,2 
(15) 
Given  q1 and  q2  the  system  (15)  can  be  solved  for  Et,  El,  C,,  C2 and  p.  q1 
and  q2  can  then  be  determined  from  the  isoperimetric  constraints  (14).  The 
solutions  are  continuous  functions  of  t. As  for  a,  if  a,, +  (me,  then  E!“u’,  C’/‘~) 
and  p(“.’  converge  to  Ei(u’o),  Cjao)  and  p (a,)  (almost  everywhere  w;th  respect 
to  the  Lebesgue  measure).  Define 
B,(a)  E’ i”p’a’(  F,(  El(@) -  Cln))  dt. 
B,  is the  ‘shadow  value’ of  country  l’s  total  exports.  Then 
1  p’*‘(  F,(  El”‘)  -  Cl’@) I+“‘(  C,ca’+ Gin)) 
5  (1 -  a)e-Pl’C{a)  u;(  Cj”))  + aemPTJn)u;(  Cj’“‘) 
_<  emPlrul( Cia’)  + eeP2’uZ( C-j@) 
s  eCPlfu(Cl)  + emP~‘u,(C,). 
Hence  B,(a)  I  M,  + MI,  where 
M,=max 
(1 
~me-p~‘Ui(Ci)drlF,(E,)  +F,(E,)  2  C,)  < co, 
and  <  the  corresponding  optimal  programs.  By  the  Lebesgue-dominated 
convergence  theorem  B,(a)  is continuous  in  a.  Since obviously 
limB,(a)  < 0  and  lim  B,(a)  > 0, 
a/O  a-+00 
there  is  by  the  intermediate  value  theorem  an  a0  such  that  B1(ao)  = 0.  The 206  C.  Elbers  and  C.  Withagen,  Trading  in  exhaustible  resources 
corresponding  system  of  necessary conditions  are  the  conditions  of  a compe- 
titive  equilibrium  (4)-(12)  with  +i = 1 and  &  = l/a,,. 
6. Welfare  properties 
In  this  section  we  show  that  the  two  classical  propositions  of  welfare 
economics  hold  in  the  case at hand.  Let  (i,,  i2)  be a Pareto-optimal  consump- 
tion-exploitation  plan.  Then 
for  all  {C,  > that  satisfy 
C,=F,+F,-C,, 
/ 0 





emp2’uz( C,)  dr  1 /me-pl’U2(  Cl)  dt. 
0 
Hence,  there  exist  constants  @, q1  and  &  and  piece-wise  continuous  fil,  fi2 
and  x  such  that,  for  all  t, 
eePl’u;(  C,)  = X, 
Qe -%;(  tl)  = x, 
~F;(~',)-~l+$l=O, 
XF;(E,)-Q~+~~~=~. 
These  conditions  are  equivalent  to  the  conditions  (8)-(11)  by  a proper  choice 
of  the  co-state  variables.  Hence,  obviously  every  Pareto-efficient  allocation  can 
be  attained  as  a  competitive  equilibrium  by  an  appropriate  redistribution  of 
the  resources. 
It  is also  easily  seen that  if  a program  satisfies  these necessary conditions,  it 
is Pareto-optimal.  Hence,  the competitive  equilibrium  is Pareto-optimal. 
7.  An  example 
To  depict  an  explicit  solution  we  take  the  following  translated  Cobb- 
Douglas  conversion  functions: 
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Suppose  that  both  resources are  only  exhausted  in  infinity: 
where  ri  are  constants  (to  be  determined). 
Both  resources  will  eventually  be  exhausted  so  E,(f)  +  0  as t +  co. There- 
fore 
m,/~  =  C’(  E,)/&‘(  E,)  =  F,'(O)/F,'(O) 
E,=  [(a,p/rr:-“l~;)l’l-.‘-1](1,. 
If  we  substitute  this  in  the  resource  constraint,  we  get 
/ 
DE,dt  = 1, 
0 
JmEzdl  = 1. 
0 
So with  (16)  and  after  some  manipulations, 
m 
/  k 
c-x1  p/u:  -n’7r1  > 
l/l  -a2 
0 
-  l]  dr  = l/a2. 
(16) 
In  a  number  of  cases this  condition  is  violated  regardless  of  p  and,  hence, 
irrespective  of  the  form  of  the  utility  functions.  These  cases are 
We  conclude  that  if  one  of  the  relations  in  (18)  holds,  one  of  the  resources will 
be  exhausted  in  finite  time. 
Note  that  we  have  a case of  dynamic  inconsistency  here.  Under  the  condi- 
tions  postulated  it  is  advantageous  for  both  countries  to  engage  in  trade.  In 
fact,  the  competitive  equilibrium  is a core  allocation.  On  the  other  hand,  once 
one  country  has  no  resources left,  the  other  country  will  change  its  behaviour 
according  to  its  new  monopolist  status.  (It  is,  of  course,  not  clear  from  our 
model  what  this  exactly  means.)  There  are  two  conceivable  ways  out  of  this 
problem.  One  is to  assume  the  existence  of  a supra-national  power  that  could 
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when  there  is  a  danger  that  countries  run  out  of  their  resource,  strategic 
considerations  come  into  the  picture,  so  a  competitive  solution  n&specifies 
behaviour. 
In  the  cases not  covered  by  (18),  it  will  depend  on  p  whether  (17)  is violated 
or  not.  If  one  finds  a decreasing  continuous  p  that  satisfies  (17),  then  from  it 
utility  functions  can  be  derived  that  satisfy  the  conditions  on  the  optimal 
consumption  plan  and  Ci = Fi( E,.). In  this  case (no  trade)  it  is clear  that  both 
resources  will  only  be  exhausted  in  infinity.  We  believe  however,  that  in  the 
‘typical’  case  one  of  the  resources  is  exhausted  in  finite  time,  and  that  the 
phenomenon  can  be  encountered  in  any  model  of  general  equilibrium  with 
exhaustible  resources.  It  deserves to  be  studied  more  closely. 
8.  Conclusions 
In  the  present  paper  we have given  a simple  two-country  model  of  trade  with 
exhaustible  resources.  In  this  model  it  was  possible  to  establish  existence  and 
the  familiar  welfare  properties  of  a competitive  equilibrium.  It  is argued  that 
typically  one  of  the  countries  runs  out  of  resources in finite  time,  which  poses a 
problem  of  dynamic  inconsistency. 
It  would  be  interesting  to  see exhaustible  resources  introduced  into  larger 
equilibrium  models.  Exhaustible  resources  represent  a  special  type  of  en- 
dowments  and  technology  that  may  have  general  implications  for  the  equi- 
librium  solution.  As  for  the  present  model,  the  natural  extension  could  be  to 
acknowledge  the  fact  that  there  are  really  two  goods  in  the  economy:  a 
resource  good  and  a  consumption  good.  Trade  should  be  allowed  in  both 
goods. 
Finally,  the  literature  on  exhaustible  resources  studies  production  and 
consumption  decisions  by  continuous  time  control  models.  Conceptually  there 
is no  difficulty  in  combining  these decisions  in  a general  equilibrium,  although 
some  hypothesis  of  price  expectations  must  be  made.  However,  existence  of 
equilibrium  price  functions  cannot  be  proved  using  conventional  proofs  be- 
cause  the  dimension  of  the  commodity  space is infinite. 
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